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Article 7 has not been totally ignored in the legal literature of our time,
but it has not inspired violent feelings and great controversy. Considering how
common warehouse receipts and bills of lading are, the litigation and the
literature are sparse. This may be, at least in part, because some of the
ramifications of documentary transactions are little understood and largely
ignored. This Article deals with problems, some litigated and some not, which
seem to be relevant to our time.
Section I considers the extent to which bailors may limit their liability
for loss of bailed items under Article 7. In particular, a New York decision,
LC.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., 2 seems to raise serious
questions about the bailor's ability to limit liability for negligent loss of items,
as opposed to actual conversion. Sections 113 and L14 deal with complicated
questions of which party has priority in collateral subject to security interests
when goods are subject to document of title.
I. LiABILrY FOR LOST GOODS: DEFINING § 7-204 "CONVERSION"
Suppose that a bailor stores goods in a warehouse, receiving a warehouse
receipt stating that the warehouseman's liability is limited to fifty dollars for
damage to each identified item which has been bailed, although the bailor has
the option of paying an increased rate based on increased valuation of the
goods if a higher degree of protection is desired. No fee for increased protec-
tion is paid. When return of the goods is demanded and they cannot be
produced by the bailee, is the bailee's liability per item limited to fifty dollars
when no increased rate is paid?
It would seem to be reasonably clear under section 7-204(1) of the
Uniform Commercial Code that a "warehouseman is liable for loss of or injury
to goods caused by his failure to exercise such care in regard to them as a
reasonably careful man would exercise under like circumstances . . . ," but
nevertheless the "damages may be limited by a term in the warehouse receipt
or storage agreement limiting the amount of liability in case of loss or
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco.
This Article is in part adapted from material which will appear in a treatise to be published by ALI-ABA.
i. See notes 1-30 and accompanying text infra.
2. 50 N.Y.2d 657, 409 N.E.2d 849, 431 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1980).
3. See notes 31-64 and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 65-108 and accompanying text infra.
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damage .... .. The section goes on to provide that the bailor may request in
writing, at the time the storage agreement is signed or within a reasonable
time after the warehouse receipt is received, that the liability be increased, in
which event increased rates based on increased valuation may be charged,
unless such an increase is contrary to a lawful limitation contained in the
warehouseman's tariff.6 But "[n]o such limitation is effective with respect to
the warehouseman's liability for conversion to his own use.",
7
The clear implication to be derived from the statute is that a limitation of
liability in the warehouse receipt8 is effective unless the warehouseman con-
verts the goods to his own use. What is a conversion? According to Prosser,
"[a] conversion can result only from conduct intended to affect the chattel.
For merely negligent interference with it, such as failure to protect it against
loss, damage or theft, the remedy is an action for negligence .... 9
Moreover,
[n]ot every failure to deliver upon demand.., will constitute a conversion. The
defendant does not become a converter when the goods are no longer in his
possession or control, so that he is unable to comply with the demand, even
though they may have been lost or destroyed through his fault. The remedy in
such a case is an action for "negligence." t
While shrouded in the mists of history,
the [modem] tort of conversion has been confined to those major interferences
with the chattel, or with the plaintiff's rights in it, which are so serious, and so
important, as to justify the forced judicial sale to the defendant which is the
distinguishing feature of the action .... [Among factors to be considered are] the
extent and duration of defendant's exercise of control over the chattel; his intent
to assert a right which is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff's right of control; the
defendant's good faith or bad intentions; the extent and duration of the resulting
interference with the plaintiff's right of control; the harm done to the chattel; and
the expense and inconvenience caused to the plaintiff. "
For whatever the reason, there are apparently occasions when goods
disappear from warehouses and simply cannot be produced at the demand of
the bailor. In such cases the Code provides for liability in damages for loss or
injury caused by a failure to exercise the care of a "reasonably careful man"
and allows this liability to be limited in amount, subject to the bailor's right to
5. U.C.C. § 7-204(1) and (2). [References not otherwise identified hereinafter will be to the 1972 version of
the Code.]
6. Id. See § 7-103, stating that the provisions of Article 7 are subject to any applicable "tariff, classifica-
tion or regulations filed or issued pursuant thereto" to the extent that they are applicable.
7. § 7-204(2) (last sentence).
8. Section 7-204(2) provides that damages may be "limited by a term in the warehouse receipt or storage
agreement..., but "storage agreement" is not defined in the Code or used in any other section. As used in
the section, storage agreement may be synonymous with warehouse receipt or it may refer to a situation where a
storage agreement covers the bailment but does not meet the requirements of a warehouse receipt. Section
7-202 "does not require that a warehouse receipt be issued but states formal requirements for those which are
issued." § 7-202, comment.
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 83 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Id. at 90 (footnotes omitted).
11. Id. at 80-81 (footnote omitted).
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pay an additional fee to increase the liability.1 2 This limitation is effective
unless the warehouseman has converted the goods "to his own use." 3 There
is no requirement that the limitation be stated in conspicuous type,'4 but the
limitation must set forth "a specific liability per article or item, or value per
unit of weight." 15 A general limitation of fifty dollars, for example, for all
goods subject to a receipt would not necessarily seem to comply with the
statute,'6 and a total exoneration of the bailee from any liability also would
appear to be ineffective.
17
The recent New York Court of Appeals decision in LC.C. Metals, Inc. v.
Municipal Warehouse Co.,'8 raises some interesting questions in this area.
Here three separate lots of indium, having an aggregate value of $100,000,
were stored in a warehouse. Each warehouse receipt contained a limitation of
liability for listed items of fifty dollars and provided that the liability could be
increased by the payment of increased rates. (The liability was for "damage"
but an inability to return the items would seem to result in maximum liability,
not to exceed actual value, so that loss of the property might be construed to
be "damage" in the sense of total loss.) The bailor neither requested in-
creased liability nor told the bailee of the value of the metal. After about two
years, during which the bailor paid a storage charge monthly, the return of the
goods was demanded. The goods could not be found or returned. The bailor
sued in conversion, and the bailee defended on the ground of theft and relied
on the contractual limitation of liability to $50 for each lot of indium.' 9
Plaintiff was granted summary judgment for the full value of the indium and
both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals affirmed .
When goods cannot be returned by a warehouseman, then the liability
would appear to be the value of the goods, whether negligence or conversion
is claimed. The difference between charging negligence or conversion in most
cases seems to lie in the ability of the warehouseman to rely on a limitation of
liability in one case but not in the other. In a certain number of cases, the
bailor presumably has its own insurance, obtained perhaps at rates lower than
the warehouse would charge for comparable coverage, which is probably in
turn covered by insurance. Indeed, in this instance the bailor had its own
insurance and reported the loss as a "theft,' 21 which would seem to be
12. § 7-204(l)
13. § 7-204(2)
14. See Sanfisket, Inc. v. Atlantic Cold Storage Corp., 347 So. 2d 647 (Fla. App. 1977).
15. § 7-204(2). See Keefe v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 36 Colo. App. 382, 540 P.2d 1132 (1975); Durfee v.
Blue Rock Van & Storage, Inc., 266 A.2d 187 (Del. Super. 1970). See also World Prods., Inc. v. Central Freight
Serv., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 849 (D.N.J. 1963), afj'd, 342 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1965) (based on pre-Code law); Annot. 21
A.L.R.3d 1339.
16. See Modelia, Inc v. Rose Warehouse, Inc., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
17. § 7-202(3).
18. 50 N.Y.2d 657, 409 N.E.2d 849, 431 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1980).
19. Id. at 661-62, 409 N.E.2d at 851-52, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 374-75.
20. Id. at 662, 409 N.E.2d at 852, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
21. Id. at 664 n.3,409 N.E.2d at 853 n.3, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 377 n.3: "ICC reported the loss to its insurers as a
theft ......
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inconsistent with claiming the warehouseman had converted the goods "to his
own use," as section 7-204(2) requires. If the bailor collected from its own
insurance company, as seems likely, then it looks as if the bailor's insurance
company is the real party in interest and, absent a showing of conversion by
the bailee's act, this loss should have been left where it lay.22
The effect of the New York decision is to eliminate the action based on
negligence so that all actions probably are now based on conversion in that
state, with the result that the contractual limitation of liability is ineffective.23
Clearly the New York Court of Appeals is not following the Restatement of
Torts, in which conversion is defined as "an intentional exercise of dominion
or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another
to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value
of the chattel." 24 There is no suggestion in the opinion that bailor introduced
any proof whatsoever that the bailee had exercised any dominion over the
goods. The problem was that the indium could not be found and the bailee had
no knowledge of what had happened to it, 5 although the bailor had reported
the loss to its insurer as a theft and presumably should have been bound by
this explanation. But the court felt that "the warehouse [was] required to
show not merely what might conceivably have happened to the goods, but
rather what actually happened to the goods.", 26 This would in many cases,
and certainly in the case of the indium, appear to be an impossibility, for the
warehouse was not aware of the disappearance of the goods until their return
was demanded and could scarcely have proved the "actual theft" of the
goods as distinguished from the probability of the theft of the goods. It would
appear to be incontrovertible that there was no proof that the warehouseman
had converted the goods "to his own use," as section 7-204(2) requires.
The dissenting judge made the cogent point that a cause of action for
conversion should not be maintainable absent proof of intentional wrongdoing
by the bailee, and no such proof was presented.27 The judge also noted that
the bailor had not disclosed to the bailee the value of the goods, had not paid
an increased storage rate commensurate with the value of the goods, and
22. The point in time at which the loss is measured may be immaterial if the bailed goods do not fluctuate in
value, as appears to have been true of indium, for the issue was not raised. The obvious point in time to measure
the loss is at the date of the loss, but this date will not always be known, as in the principal case discussed in the
text. See also Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 344, 213
N.E.2d 873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1965). In Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Reed, 339 So. 2d 547 (Miss.
1976), the date when the loss occurred was known but the bailor was not notified of the extent of loss for some
time. Goods comparable to the bailed goods had risen in value in the interim, with the result that the increased
value was used to measure the bailee's liability. Id. at 549. Had the market value of the bailed goods gone down
after the loss, it seems unlikely that the bailor would have asked for or been given a lesser amount.
23. The fall-out of LC.C. Metals is evident in a number of recent New York conversion cases. See Phillipp
Bros. Metal Corp. v. S.S. Riolguazu v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 658 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1931)
(applicable to common-law bailment); Clairol, Inc. v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 79 A.D.2d 297,436 N.Y.S.2d
279 (198 1) (conversion theory of LC.C. Metals not applicable to federal maritime carriage law).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965).
25. 50 N.Y.2d 657, 661, 408 N.E.2d 849, 852, 431 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (1980).
26. Id. at 664 n.3, 408 N.E.2d at 853 n.3, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 377 n.3.
27. Id. at 668, 409 N.E.2d at 856, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 379 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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therefore should be held to the terms of the bailment. Despite the mandate
of section 7-204, the New York Court of Appeals found "no sound reason to
apply a different rule to the two types of action where, as here, the bailee
comes forward with insufficient proof of its explanation for the loss of the
bailed goods."-29 The majority result is an instance of judicial legislation over-
riding the clear language of a statute.30
II. INVENTORY PRIORITY PROBLEMS wrrT DOCUMENTARY DRAFTs
A.
Suppose that a manufacturer of snarps contracts to sell 1000 of these
items to a retailer for sale in the ordinary course of business. Suppose further
that the inventory3' of both parties is subject to security interests which have
been properly filed and perfected. The security interest in the manufacturer's
inventory will be cut off when the goods are sold to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business, 2 and a retailer buying from a manufacturer presumably
would be such a buyer. When is the manufacturer's financer's security inter-
est cut off? When is the retailer's financer's security interest attached and
perfected?
When the manufacturer identifies the goods covered by the contract for
sale, the retailer acquires a "special property" in them.33 Ordinarily title
passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his
performance, even though the goods are being shipped under a document of
title, if the seller is required to send, but not to deliver, the goods. 4 But the
passage of title does not determine the rights of the parties. 5 From the time
the goods are identified to the contract and the buyer has acquired a "special
property" in them, presumably the buyer has sufficient rights in the goods for
a security interest to attach,36 and presumably the goods are "inventory" as
28. Id. at 671-72, 409 N.E.2d at 858, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 381-82.
29. Id. at 667, 409 N.E.2d at 855, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 379 (1980).
30. Interestingly, in Adrian Tabin Corp. v. Climax Boutique, 34 N.Y.2d 210, 313 N.E.2d 66,356 N.Y.S.2d
606 (1974), the judges occupied opposite positions, with Judge Jasen, who dissented in I.C.C. Metals, writing
the majority opinion and Judge Gabrielli, who wrote the majority opinion in LC.C. Metals, dissenting. The
majority opinion in the Adrian Tabin case gave full effect to the clear language of § 6-104(3) of the Code, while
the dissenting opinion would have given no effect to the legislation. At least these two judges seem to be
consistent in their views toward legislation, although perhaps some of their colleagues are not so consistent.
31. Under § 9-109(4), goods held for sale by the retailer would be "inventory," as would also be true of
goods held by the manufacturer. But in the case of a manufacturer "inventory" would also include "raw
materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in the business."
32. § 9-307(l). "Buyer in ordinary couse of business" is defined in § 1-201(9). A buyer in ordinary course
will take free of a perfected security interest in the seller's inventory so long as the buyer does not know that the
sale is in violation of the underlying security agreement, and while such knowlege may be rare, the problem is
not unknown. See 0. M. Scott Credit Corp. v. Apex, Inc., 97 R.I. 442, 198 A.2d 673 (1964).
33. §§ 2-401(1) and 2-501(l).
34. § 2-401(2).
35. § 2-401 (first sentence).
36. Section 9-203(1) requires that the debtor must have rights in the collateral for a security interest to
attach, and attachment is a necessary prerequisite for perfection under § 9-303(l). What is meant by "rights in
the collateral" is not explained in the Code.
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to the buyer even though they are not then "held" by the buyer, as section
9-109(4) requires.37 But for the buyer to be a buyer in ordinary course, such a
person must "buy" the goods, and "'buying' . . . includes receiving goods or
documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale."-38 There is no ex-
press definition of "buy" or "buying" in the Code, but if "buying" is inter-
preted to require receiving the goods or documents covering them, it would be
possible for a security interest to attach, because the buyer has rights in the
collateral39 before the buyer acquires "buyer in ordinary course" status and
the rights given to such a buyer under section 9-307(1). 40
This kind of problem could arise on the facts stated above if the retailer-
buyer had previously granted a security interest to its financer. The buyer
would acquire a special interest in the goods on their identification, which
ought to be sufficient for a security interest to attach; but "buyer in ordinary
course" status might arise only on receipt of the goods or documents covering
them, and one must be a buyer in ordinary course of business to take free of a
security interest created by a seller under section 9-307(1). When the buyer
acquires rights in the collateral, its financer will have a perfected security
interest if the financer has made proper filing and all of the events necessary
for attachment have occurred. Between the time when the buyer acquires
rights in the collateral (and its financer's security interest is perfected) and the
time when the buyer receives the goods or documents covering them, when
the seller's financer's security interest is cut off, there apparently are two
perfected security interests in the goods. The Code does not resolve this kind
of priority problem, in which the secured parties of two different debtors
claim interests in the same goods.
B.
When a bank finances a retail store's inventory and wants to acquire a
purchase money security interest, 41 then the store and its bank can arrange
for the bank to pay a draft drawn by the seller of goods on the buyer or the
buyer's bank when the draft is accompanied by a bill of lading in negotiable
form42 with the goods deliverable to the seller's order. The seller can indorse
37. Because of the exclusive nature of the § 9-109 categories, the only alternative is that the identified
goods are equipment, an inappropriate result in this transaction. See § 9-109, comment 3. But see id., comment 5
("it will be noted ... that any goods which are not covered by one of the other definitions in this section are to
be treated as equipment.").
38. § 1-201(9) (emphasis added).
39. § 9-203(l)(c).
40. § 9-307(1) provides, in part, "A buyer in ordinary course of business... takes free of a security
interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of
its existence."
41. Section 9-107 provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained
by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by making
advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used.
42. See § 7-104(I).
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the bill of lading and deliver it to its bank, accompanied by the draft.43 When
the bill of lading and the draft reach the buyer's bank and the draft is paid, that
bank can then control delivery of the goods. If the buyer's bank has previous-
ly filed a financing statement covering the goods, its security interest should
be perfected if the document is released to the buyer so that the buyer can
arrange for delivery. While the goods are in transit subject to a negotiable
document, a security interest in the goods is perfected by perfecting a security
interest in the document; 44 a security interest in the document might be per-
fected by filing, 45 but clearly perfection by possession of the document46 is
the only safe means of avoiding the priority problems which could arise if the
buyer were to receive the document, as to which the bank's filing was made,
and then improperly but duly negotiate47 it to a holder who would have
priority. If the buyer's bank has on request engaged to pay the seller for the
goods in a documentary transaction, as will happen when the bank has paid
the seller's draft accompanied by documents, then this is a letter of credit
transaction under Article 5.49
If we assume that the buyer's bank has acquired a perfected security
interest in a negotiable document (and the goods it represents)0 by paying a
draft accompanied by the document, the bank will ordinarily release the
document to the buyer so that the buyer can obtain possession of the goods. If
we assume that the goods are inventory and that the buyer gets possession of
the goods through surrender of the document to the bailee in order to deal
with them or process them for sale, the bank's security interest will remain
perfected for twenty-one days without filing or taking any other action.5' It is
possible, of course, that a dishonest buyer might contact another financer to
arrange double financing as soon as the buyer gets possession of the goods,
and if the first financer has filed nothing, the second financer (not aware of
having such secondary status) may file and make an advance against the
goods. This will result in two perfected security interests in the same inven-
tory. If the buyer's bank, the first secured party, files a financing statement
within twenty-one days from the time the goods or documents are made
"available" (whatever that may mean in section 9-304(5)(a)), then the bank's
security interest will continue to be perfected after the end of the twenty-one
day period.52 Which financer is entitled to priority in the goods?
43. See § 4-501 and 4-504 on collection of documentary drafts. A "documentary draft" is defined in
§ 4-104()(f) as a "negotiable or non-negotiable draft with accompanying documents ... to be delivered against




47. Section 7-501(4) states when a document is "duly negotiated." A document could be duly negotiated
even though the negotiation was in violation of an underlying agreement.
48. § 9-309 and 7-502(I).
49. 99 5-102(l)(a) and 5-103(1)(a).
50. Subject to the provisions of § 7-205 and 7-503, a holder to whom a negotiable document of title has
been duly negotiated acquires title to the document and title to the goods. § 7-502(1).
51. § 9-304(5)(a).
52. 99 9-303(2) and 9-304(6).
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Section 9-312(3) deals with priority between a purchase money security
interest and a conflicting security interest in the same inventory, and it gives
priority to the purchase money financer who meets the requirements of the
section. The first requirement is that the purchase money security interest
must be perfected when the debtor receives possession of the inventory; 53
this requirement is met on the facts stated. The second requirement is that
the purchase money secured party [give] notification in writing to the holder of the
conflicting security interest if the holder has filed a financing statement covering
the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing made by the purchase
money secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of the 21 day period where the
purchase money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or pos-
session (subsection (5) of Section 9-304) .... 54
This provision clearly contemplates a situation in which a financing
statement claiming inventory is on file before the purchase money financing
takes place. On our facts the holder of the conflicting security interest (the
second financer) does not have a financing statement on file when the debtor
receives possession of the goods subject to the purchase money security
interest, and this presumably marks the beginning of the twenty-one day
period.5 5 (The starting of the twenty-one day period is not as clearly ex-
pressed in section 9-304(5)(a) as it might be, and the period may begin running
when the document is released to the debtor rather than when the debtor gets
the goods.) The purchase money secured party cannot send a notice of pur-
chase money financing to a secured party who is not in existence at the time
the notice is required to be sent. While this problem would seem to be in-
tended to fall (if it falls anywhere) under clause (ii) of section 9-312(3)(b), it
arguably falls under clause (i), quoted above,56 because the holder of the
conflicting interest has indeed filed a financing statement before the date of
the filing made by the purchase money secured party. But where section
9-304(5)(a) is involved, as it is here, it seems only reasonable to resolve the
problem under section 9-312(3)(b)(ii), relating to the twenty-one day period, if
that can be done. But such a resolution does not seem to be possible here
because the second financer would not have a filed financing statement.
Unfortunately, in the context of our problem, the last clause, added to section
9-304(5)(a) in the 1972 version of Article 9, says that "priority between con-
flicting security interests in the goods is subject to subsection (3) of section
9-312. . . ." The clause was added to make clear that Section 9-304 was
intended to refer to perfection, not priority. 7 The provision was not designed
53. § 9-312(3)(a).
54. § 9-312(3)(b).
55. The 21-day period comes from § 60(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, II U.S.C. § 96(a)(7) (1976)
(repealed 1978). Its effect was to immunize from a preference attack those new value security interests which it
covered. The somewhat comparable provision in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1 1 U.S.C. § 547(e) (Supp.
11 1978), reduces the period from 21 days to 10.
56. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
57. § 9-304, comment 4; REvIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9, FINAL REPORT 90 (1971).
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to cover our problem in which no prior inventory financer has filed. It
covers the case in which an inventory financer has filed and a subsequent
purchase money financer enters the scene by documentary financing, but not
the reverse. If the problem is not covered by section 9-312(3), then section
9-312(5) should resolve the problem. This residual provision would rank con-
flicting security interests "according to time of filing or perfection. Priority
dates from the time a filing is first made covering the collateral or the time the
security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier .... 58
Under this provision priority would go to the purchase money security
interest which was perfected before the second secured party filed. The first
security interest in the goods was perfected by possession of the negotiable
document covering the goods prior to the time the debtor received possession
of the goods or the second secured party filed. For twenty-one days the
security interest was perfected, first in the document and, after its surrender
to the bailee, in the goods.59 Perfection continued after the twenty-one day
period because of a timely filing ° This problem will not come under section
7-504(1), because the document is duly negotiated, not transferred, and the
title to the section refers to "Rights Acquired in the Absence of Due Negotia-
tion.",
61
Would it have made any difference if the goods had been shipped under a
non-negotiable document? So long as goods were in the possession of a bailee
who had issued a non-negotiable document, the first financer's security inter-
est could have been perfected by having the document issued in the bank's
name as consignee, or by the carrier's receipt of notice of the financer's
security interest, or by filing as to the goods, 62 although determining the
proper place to file might have presented some problems. 63 If the interest was
perfected, it would remain perfected on release of the goods to the debtor in
the same circumstances as would a security interest arising under a negotiable
document. 64
III. WAREHOUSED INVENTORY PRIORITY PROBLEMS
Suppose that a retail store and a bank have entered into a security agree-
ment covering inventory and that the bank has advanced funds and has
promptly filed a financing statement in the proper office. This is not a pur-
chase money arrangement, but both the agreement and the statement cover all
inventory owned by the debtor during the five-year period of the financing.
Suppose that a shipment of inventory arrives on the store's premises when it
58. § 9-312(5)(a).
59. § 9-304(4), (5).
60. § 9-303(2).
61. § 7-504 (caption).
62. § 9-304(3).
63. See § 9-401(l).
64. § 9-304(5). See id., comment 4.
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cannot conveniently be accommodated, and the store decides to store the
inventory in a warehouse, gets a negotiable warehouse receipt, and then
negotiates this receipt to a finance company as collateral for a loan. Which
secured party will be entitled to priority in the goods, the bank with a filed and
perfected security interest in the inventory or the finance company which has
lent against a negotiable document of title representing the same goods and
which has a perfected security interest in the goods by virtue of possession of
the negotiable document?65
Section 9-309 provides that nothing in Article 9 limits the rights of a
"holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated
(Section 7-501)," and such a holder will "take priority over an earlier security
interest even though perfected. Filing under... [Article 9] does not consti-
tute notice of the security interest to such holders .... " Under the rules of
section 7-501, a negotiable document of title running to the order of a named
person is negotiated by indorsement and delivery, and a document running to
bearer, either because it is issued in that form or because it has been properly
indorsed in blank, can be negotiated simply by delivery.6 "As in the case of
commercial paper, 67 if a negotiable document is indorsed to a named person,
that person's indorsement is required plus delivery of the document for
negotiation.68 If the document has been negotiated in accordance with these
rules, it will be "duly negotiated" if the holder "purchases it in good faith
without notice of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person
and for value, unless it is established that the negotiation is not in the regular
course of business or financing or involves receiving the document in settle-
ment or payment of a money obligation." '69 The "regular course" require-
ment prevents non-professionals from "duly negotiating" documents of
title.70
If a document of title has been duly negotiated, the holder acquires title to
the document and title to the goods, unless those rights are cut down by
section 7-205 on fungible goods or section 7-503 dealing with certain situa-
tions where the document does not cut off prior interests. 7' Section 7-205 will
have no effect on our problem, for it protects a buyer in ordinary course who
buys fungible goods sold and delivered by a warehouseman who is also in the
business of buying and selling such goods. 72 On the other hand, section 7-
503(1) states:
65. §§ 9-304(2) and 9-305.
66. § 7-501(1), (2).
67. §§ 3-204() and 3-202(1).
68. § 7-501(3).
69. § 7-501(4).
70. See § 7-501, comment 1.
71. § 7-502(1).
72. § 7-205 provides: "A buyer in the ordinary course of business of fungible goods sold and delivered by a
warehouseman who is also in the business of buying and selling such goods takes free of any claim under a
warehouse receipt even though it has been duly negotiated."
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A document of title confers no right in goods against a person who before
issuance of the document had a legal interest or a perfected security interest in
them and who neither
(a) delivered or entrusted them or any document of title covering them to the
bailor or his nominee with actual or apparent authority to ship, store or sell or with
power to obtain delivery under this Article (Section 7-403) or with power of
disposition under this Act (Sections 2-403 and 9-307) or other statute or rule of
law; nor
(b) acquiesced in the procurement by the bailor or his nominee of any doc-
ument of title.
The finance company will be asserting rights under a document of title,
which we will assume it received by due negotiation, and therefore the finance
company will acquire title to the goods by due negotiation of the document
unless section 7-503(1) cuts down these rights.
If no "other statute or rule of law" applies to these facts, did the bank
give the store a "power of disposition" under sections 2-403 or 9-307? The
finance company did not acquire its interest in the goods through a sale,73 and
the finance company as a secured party could not be a buyer in ordinary
course of business74 without a sale, so there could be no reliance on a "power
of disposition" under section 9-307.
The possibilities of using section 2-403 are not so easily eliminated, for it
seems clear that the store must have a "power of disposition" in the case of
sales from inventory, and a secured party should be treated as a
"purchaser" 75 who can cut off security interests in the proper circumstances.
In a proper fact situation it might be claimed that the bank "acquiesced" in
the procurement of the document if the bank knew that the store had no space
adequate to accommodate the inventory on its own premises, but it would be
foolish for a financer knowingly to allow its debtor to put goods into a ware-
house which could issue warehouse receipts which might be negotiated to
innocent third parties, and it will be assumed that the bank had no knowledge
of this transaction. Unless acquiescence in procuring the document can be
found, the other possibilities of cutting off the bank's interest would seem to
founder on the requirement that the bank "delivered or entrusted" the goods
to the store "with actual or apparent authority to ship, store or sell" the
goods, 76 for the bank in no sense delivered to the store the goods or a doc-
ument covering them. Arguably the bank might be said to have "entrusted"
the goods to the store, if the definition of "entrusting" is taken from section
2-403(3), but if the consequences of an entrustment are those stated in section
73. "Sale" is defined in § 2-106(1): "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price (Section 2-401)."
74. "Buyer in ordinary course of business" is defined in § 1-202(9), and one must be such a buyer in order
to cut off a security interest created by his seller under § 9-307(1). The possibilities contained in § 9-307(2) and
(3) are inapplicable, for we are not dealing with consumer goods or future advances.
75. A "purchaser" is "a person who takes by purchase," under the definition of § 1-201(33), and "pur-
chase" includes any "voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." § 1-201(32).
76. § 7-503(i)(a).
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2-403(2), 77 the entruster's rights can be cut off only by a buyer in ordinary
course of business, which the finance company could not be,78 and it is to
section 2-403 that section 7-503(1)(a) refers.
The priority problem arising between the security interests of the bank
and the finance company apparently has to be resolved under section 9-312
because it is not covered by any of the other priority rules in Article 9.
Because the other provisions of section 9-312 do not apply, we are left with
the residual rules of section 9-312(5), giving priority in the order of filing or
perfection. The bank's security interest was perfected first, and it was per-
fected by filing, so the bank should have priority. This seems to be required
by the Code, and it may be thought to be a fair answer because the bank's
security interest was a matter of public record before the finance company
acquired its security interest and advanced funds.
If the store had warehoused the inventory subject to the bank's perfected
security interest and received a non-negotiable receipt in the finance
company's name, the finance company's security interest would have been
perfected by the issuance of the receipt.79 Again, the bank's security interest
would be entitled to priority under section 9-312(5) because it was perfected
first and it was perfected by filing. 0 This would seem to comport with the
provision contained in section 7-504(1), by which the transferee of a doc-
ument, which the finance company would be in the case of a non-negotiable
document, acquires the title and rights of the transferor, the store.8 ' The store's
rights would be subject to whatever interest the bank had in the goods. s8
To change the facts in the example, assume that the bank files a financing
statement, proper in all respects, covering the store's inventory before the
bank and the store enter into a security agreement or the bank advances any
funds. The bank might choose to do this in an attempt to assure priority over a
purchase money inventory financer, relying on sections 9-312(3) and (5).
After this filing the store receives the inventory in question and promptly
stores it in a warehouse, and the warehouse issues a non-negotiable receipt in
the finance company's name, which is immediately pledged to the finance
company as collateral for a loan. Then the bank and the store enter into a
security agreement and the bank advances its loan, at which point the bank
has a perfected security interest. 83 If a problem now arose, which secured
77. Section 2-403(2) provides a merchant entrusted with goods in which he deals the "power to transfer all
rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." See generally Dolan, Good Faith Purchase
and Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles 2, 7, and 9 of the UCC, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1
(1978).
78. § 2-403, comment 2.
79. § 9-304(3).
80. See Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Irving R. Boody Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 560 (1963) (Funk,
Arb.). See also Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
176 (W. D. Mich. 1971).
81. Section 7-504(1) provides, in part: "A transferee at a document .... to whom the document has been
delivered but not duly negotiated acquires the title and rights which his transferor had or had actual authority to
convey."
82. See § 9-311.
83. §§ 9-303(1) and 9-203(1).
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party would have priority under Section 9-312(5)? The bank might be said to
have filed first (but "first" only in the sense that the finance company did not
file at all), but it did not perfect first. The finance company perfected its
security interest by having a document issued in its name, 84 and this occurred
before there was a security agreement or any funds were advanced by the
bank. Under the 1962 version of section 9-312(5), 85 because both parties did
not file, priority would be determined in the order of perfection, which would
give priority to the finance company. If the 1972 version of section 9-312(5) is
read to give priority to the bank because of its filing, then this result does not
seem to be in accord with section 7-504(1) which would give the transferee of
the document whatever title and rights the transferor had.
Assume that the facts are the same as those stated immediately above
except that the non-negotiable receipt was issued in the store's name and then
pledged with the finance company. In this case, the pledge will not perfect the
finance company's security interest.86 Where goods are held by a bailee who
has issued a non-negotiable document, a security interest in the goods could
be perfected by filing as to the goods, by the bailee's receipt of notification of
the secured party's interest, or by having a new document issued in the
finance company's name.Y7 If we assume that the finance company notified
the bailee of its interest or had a new document issued in its name before the
bank's security interest was perfected, then the finance company's interest
would be perfected first. If the finance company were entitled to priority
under section 9-312(5), the result would be in accord with section 7-504(1)
under which a transferee of a non-negotiable document would acquire the title
and rights of the transferor at the time of the transfer. If the store had trans-
ferred its right in the goods to the finance company, presumably there might
be no rights left in the goods to which the bank's security interest could
thereafter attach, and attachment is required for perfection.8 If section
9-312(5) requires priority for the bank because it filed first, then different
results come out of the two sections.
If the finance company had a perfected security interest which did not
extend to the full value of the collateral, the debtor's interest in the goods-
the debtor's equity, perhaps-could be transferred to the bank.as Of course,
on our facts the bank was the first to file a financing statement but the second
to perfect its security interest. Would it raise a conflict between section 9-
312(5) and section 7-504(1) if the finance company, having perfected its inter-
est otherwise than by filing, subsequently filed?
84. § 9-304(3).
85. Under § 9-312(5) of the 1962 Code, priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral
was determined "(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing... ; (b) in the order of perfection unless
both are perfected by filing."
86. See § 9-305.
87. § 9-304(3). If the finance company perfected its security interest by having a document issued in its
name or by notifying the bailee of its interest and thereafter a financing statement was filed while the bailee still
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According to section 9-312(5)(a) of the 1972 Code:
Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfec-
tion. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the collateral or the
time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier, provided there is
no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.
Under the comparable provision of the 1962 Code, priority was deter-
mined, first, in the order of filing if both were perfected by filing, and, then, in
the order of perfection if both were not perfected by filing; and in both cases
priority was determined without regard to which interest attached first or
whether it attached before or after filing, if perfection was by filing.
On our facts the bank filed first but its security interest was perfected
after the finance company's security interest, which was initially perfected by
a means other than filing, although a filing was made.
To show how the newer provision is intended to work, example 3 in the
official comment to section 9-312 states:
A has a temporarily perfected (21 day) security interest, unfiled, in a negotiable
document in the debtor's possession under Section 9-304(4) or (5). On the fifth day
B files and thus perfects a security interest in the same document. On the tenth day
A files. A has priority, whether or not he knows of B's interest when he files,
because he perfected first and has maintained continuous perfection or filing.
It should be noted that on the facts in the example both security interests
are in a negotiable document, and a security interest in goods subject to a
negotiable document is perfected by perfecting a security interest in the
document, 90 which may be done either by possession of the document 9' or by
filing, 92 but there may be a temporarily perfected security interest in a negoti-
able document without either filing or possession for twenty-one days from
the time of attachment to the extent the interest arises for new value under a
written security agreement. 93 In example 3 both security interests are per-
fected from the time they arise. In the situation posited above in the text, the
goods are subject to a non-negotiable document, there is no automatic perfec-
tion, the document does not represent the goods, and the first filing, by the
bank, did not perfect a security interest at the time of the filing. Example 3
therefore has no application to our problem.
Section 9-312(5)(a) can be read to give priority to the finance company on
the basis that it made the first filing "covering the collateral" and the bank's
earlier filing was not effective at the time it was made because at the time of
the filing the parties had not entered into a security agreement and the debtor
had not granted a security interest in anything, so that there is no
"collateral" 94 at this point in time. This kind of analysis is similar to reason-
90. § 9-304(2). This assumes that the goods are in the issuer's possession.
91. § 9-305.
92. § 9-304(1).
93. § 9-304(4). Section 9-304(5) also provides for a 21-day temporary perfection in the situations covered.
94. Section 9-105(1)(c) defines "collateral" as "'property subject to a security interest."
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ing found in some cases arising under section 9-312(4), 95 but it appears not to
be the result contemplated for section 9-312(5) by the drafters of the official
text of the Code, in that priority is intended to be in the order of filing where
both secured parties file, % although the result is perhaps less than crystal
clear based on the statutory language: "Priority dates from the time a filing is
first made covering the collateral or the time the security interest is first
perfected, whichever is earlier .. ."97 If this provision is read to give the
bank priority because of its earlier filing, then there again appears to be a
conflict with Article 7.98 Section 7-504(1) states, "A transferee of a doc-
ument, whether negotiable or non-negotiable, to whom the document has
been delivered but not duly negotiated, acquires the title and rights which his
transferor had or had actual authority to convey." Here there were rights for
the store to transfer to the finance company, for there was no other security
interest in the goods at the time this transaction was entered into, and the
finance company notified the bailee of its interest or had a document issued in
its name. The bank had a financing statement on file but there was no security
agreement and no loan had been made.
This may be one of those situations where the security agreement
between the store and the bank is effective according to its terms between the
parties "except as otherwise provided by this Act," 99 and the Act, meaning
the entire Code, provides otherwise in section 7-504(1) by restricting the
collateral which can be subjected to the bank's security interest, and that
collateral will be what is left after the interest arising under the document is
satisfied.
If the finance company had purchased the non-negotiable document from
the store between the time when the bank filed a financing statement and the
time when the bank and the store entered into a security agreement and funds
were advanced, the finance company would appear to prevail over the bank
under the rule of section 7-504(l), even though the transfer of ownership was
accomplished by the transfer of a non-negotiable document of title, following
which transfer the bailee should have been given the required notification
under section 7-504(2). This situation does not involve a conflict between
security interests, and it would not be resolved by section 9-312. It is possible
that the finance company could qualify as a buyer in ordinary course of
95. See, e.g., Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1970).
96. See § 9-312, comment 5, example 1. In example I the debtor apparently owned the collateral prior to
the times when the conflicting security interests were entered into.
97. § 9-312(5)(a) (second sentence) (emphasis added).
98. For other possible conflicts between Article 7 and Article 9, see Dolan, Good Faith Purchase and
Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the Interplay of Articles 2, 7, and 9 of the UCC, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1978).
In this important article, Professor Dolan's proposed resolution of conflicts between Article 7 and Article 9 is
somewhat different from the suggested resolution in the text of the present article. Professor Dolan would
resolve conflicts between secured parties under Article 9; the present article does not accept that view in all
cases and is, at least to that extent, unorthodox.
99. § 9-201 (emphasis added).
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business by receiving documents of title'0° in place of goods, and such a buyer
would take the goods free of a perfected security interest, 0' so there should
be no question of taking free of a non-existent one. If the finance company is
not a buyer in ordinary course, then as a person buying documents or goods
and giving value and receiving delivery of the "collateral" without knowledge
of the unperfected security interest, the finance company would have priority
over an unperfected security interest.'0 2 But again the bank has no security
interest at the time of the transfer of the document. There appears to be no
way that the bank could prevail over the finance company as transferee of the
document under section 7-504(1) if the finance company gives the bailee
prompt notice of the transfer and, depending on further facts, even in the
absence of notice.
In a few situations there are, arguably, conflicts between Article 7 and
Article 9. However, rights arising under documents of title are specified in
Article 7, and it is these rights which may be subjected to security interests
under Article 9. In some cases of presumed conflict, the debtor may have no
interest left which could be transferred to a secured party or to a second
secured party.'0 3 While Article 9 has a section delineating its coverage,'04
Article 7 has no scope section. Section 7-103 states that the provisions of
Article 7 are subject to "any treaty or statute of the United States, regulatory
statute of this State or tariff, classification or regulation filed or issued
pursuant thereto" to the extent that they are applicable, from which it may be
inferred that Article 7 covers whatever it covers and that nothing elsewhere in
the Code is intended to override whatever Article 7 says on a point within its
coverage.
The 1972 revisions in sections 9-304(5) and 9-312(5) were designed to
protect an inventory secured party who had filed and who made advances
against in coming inventory, 05 but the protection is given in the absence of
100. See § 1-201(9) (third sentence): "'Buying' ... includes receiving... documents of title under a
pre-existing contract for sale ...."
101. § 9-307(l). Although apparently not involvingasale ofgoods subject to a document, abuyerofgoods
not in the possession of the seller but stored at the time of the sale on the premises of one subsequently asserting
a security interest was held to be a buyer in ordinary course in Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976). See R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 134-35 (2d ed. 1979).
102. § 9-301(l)(c).
103. Section 9-203(l)(c) requires that the debtor must have "rights in the collateral" fora security interest
to attach and be enforceable against the debtor. There is no explanation in the Code as to what those rights must
be.
104. § 9-102.
105. REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9, FINAL REPORT 222 (1971): "[Tmhe obvious purpose of Section
9-312(3) [is] to permit a first-filed inventory financer to rely on his priority in making advances unless he
receives notice of a competing purchase money security interest before the debtor receives the inventory."
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future advances. ' 6 Some priority questions were resolved more satisfactorily
under the 1962 version of Article 9 which was facially consistent with the
provisions of Article 7. The delay between the time when a filing is made 0 7
and the time when the filing becomes accessible to a searcher may result in a
documentary financer coming into the picture in entire good faith with no
possibility of knowing of an earlier filing, and the filing may not have been
effective to perfect a security interest at the time it was made. This problem
may deserve fresh thought.
106. The first sentence of § 9-312(7) of the 1972 Code, which in general gives future advances the same
priority under § 9-312(5) as the first advance, would in fact appear to be redundant when that result is in any
case required by § 9-312(5).
107. A filing is effective on its acceptance or on its presentation to the filing officer with tender of the filing
fee. § 9-403().

